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Harry Blackmun taught by example. The first time I met him, he
was the honored guest at my sister's college graduation, and we were
part of the milling crowd. When we called his name, he turned,
smiled, and graciously shook hands with our whole family. He seemed
so ordinary, soft-spoken, slight of build. Could this be one of the most
powerful men in America?
We next met in his office, during my clerkship interview. "I'm
Harry Blackmun," he said, as if I did not know, and extended his
hand. I later learned that when strangers asked what he did for a
living, he would answer, "I'm a lawyer in Washington."
In law school, we had learned to revere the larger-than-life Justices
- Holmes, Frankfurter, Douglas - brilliant, arrogant men (always
men) with slashing pens, free of indecision and self-doubt. Harry
Blackmun hardly fit that mold. During the Term I clerked, he never
gave an order. He worked constantly, arriving at seven, leaving at
seven, and reading at home until midnight. He never cut corners. He
never pretended that decision was effortless. No case was beneath his
dignity, nor any task so trivial that it could be done carelessly. "This
is the end of the line," he often said, and everything we did mattered.
Because he never forgot about the people behind the cases, neither
could we. "[W]hen was the last time your clients saw [their] children?"
he would ask at oral argument.' In dissents read from the bench, he
would mention litigants' names and how the cases affected their aspi-
rations. 2 "How will this affect real people?" he would ask, in tiny,
perfect handwriting in the margins of cert pool memos.
In Justice Blackmun's eyes, the Court belonged to the people. He
would speak at a university's graduation if no Supreme Court Justice
had ever spoken there, traveling great distances without fanfare. He
read and pondered his mail, even the most vicious hate letters. After
lunch, he would stroll around the block to see who was demonstrating,
and end by walking up the courthouse steps to remind himself of his
responsibilities.
Justice matters, we learned, but doing justice exacts its price. To
protect the privacy of others, he sacrificed his own. Almost daily, he
and his loving wife, Dottie, received hate mail, death threats, and
once, a bullet through their living room window. They came to travel
with bodyguards. As the Term wore on, the Justice's deeply lined face
showed the strain of decision. At breakfast one morning, I asked, "If
* Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law and Director, Orville
H. Schell, Jr., Center for International Human Rights, Yale University; Law Clerk to Justice
Blackmun, October Term i98i.
I Petitioners' Oral Argument at io, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (No. 80-5889).
2 See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 448 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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you had not become a judge, what would you be doing now?" "If I
had not become a judge," he answered wistfully, "I could have retired
years ago."
He served twelve more years after that. "What drove him?" I
often wondered. During that year, I would sometimes slip into his
office to leave a bench memo or to borrow a book. Over his writing
desk hung two framed documents. The first was a certificate of sale.
It noted that on February 21, 1853, S.E. Cotterliss of South Carolina
had bought a twelve year-old boy named Titus for the sum of $625.
The second, a quotation entitled "Duty As Seen By Lincoln," read:
If I were to try to read, much less answer, all the attacks made on me,
this shop might as well be closed for any other business. I do the very
best I know how - the very best I can; and I mean to keep doing so
until the end. If the end brings me out all right, what is said against me
won't amount to anything. If the end brings me out wrong, ten angels
swearing I was right would make no difference.
When the Term ended, my co-clerks and I walked the Justice to
his Volkswagen "beetle" to say goodbye. Although we were exhausted,
he suddenly seemed strong and vigorous, ready for another Term. I
realized that I now saw him differently: not just as a modest man,
diligently doing his work, but as a strong, wise man, driven by an
unremitting sense of duty and a fierce, tangible passion for justice.
These are the qualities that made Harry Blackmun grow. He did
not know why he had come to sit on the Supreme Court. Early on, he
wondered whether he was worthy. But he soon decided he had no
choice but to do the very best he knew how, the very best he could,
and to hope it would bring him out all right in the end. As he
worked, he listened. As he read, he heard. With humility came com-
passion. With real-world sensitivity came a conviction to use his voice
for the powerless.
Blackmun became perhaps the first Justice to become less isolated
from the real world by sitting on the Court. Duty made a shy man
bold. Caring and commitment made him the conscience of the Court
in the late twentieth century.
Some now fault him for "sentimentalism," claiming that he rea-
soned with his heart and not his head.3 But what would the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts have been without him? Think of the Court,
"free" of his emotion and caring. Would Roe4 have survived without
him there to defend it, fighting for the "full emancipation of women"?5
3 See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Sentimental Journey,' NEW REPUBLIC, May 2, 1994, at 13; Stuart
Taylor, Jr., Justice Blackmun's Jurisprudence of Compassion, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 1r, 1994, at 26.
4 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
S Statements on Retirement of Blackmun from Court, N.Y. TIns, Apr. 7, 1994, at A24 ("I
think [Roe] was right in 1973, and I think it was right today. I think it's a step that had to be
taken as we go down the road toward the full emancipation of women.").
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Who else would have argued in Bakke that "[i]n order to get beyond
racism, we must first take account of race"?6 Would another Justice
have written a defense of privacy more powerful, more understandable
to the average American, than Blackmun's dissent in Bowers?7 With-
out him, who would have spoken up for the Haitianss or against the
death penalty?9 DeShaney would be remembered as a technical case
about municipal liability, not about the Joshuas of the world and how
we treat them.'0
Faced with a choice between broad or crabbed readings of the
Constitution, Justice Blackmun urged that the Court "adopt a 'sympa-
thetic' reading, one which comports with dictates of fundamental jus-
tice and recognizes that compassion need not be exiled from the
province of judging."" The Court, he said, cannot "purport[] to be
the dispassionate oracle of the law, unmoved by 'natural sympathy.'
• . . [I]n this pretense, the Court itself retreats into a sterile formalism
which prevents it from recognizing either the facts of the case before it
or the legal norms that should apply to those facts." 12
Harry Blackmun taught us that, by example. For years, he gave
the Court its natural sympathy, its human face. His passion for justice
made him our Justice for passion. To ask what the Court will be
without him is to realize what we've lost, and what we gained.
6 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
7 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. I86, igg (x986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
8 See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2567-77 (x993) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
9 See Callins v. Collins, 14 S. CL 1127, 1137-38 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from de-
nial of certiorari).
10 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. i89, 212-13 (1989) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 213.
12 id. at 212.
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